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Abstract
China’s actual fiscal decentralization is one-sided: while public expenditures are largely
decentralized, fiscal revenues are recentralized after 1994. One critical consequence of the
actual system is the creation of significant fiscal imbalances at sub-national level. This paper
investigates empirically effects of fiscal imbalances on environmental performance of
Chinese provinces. First, environmental efficiency scores of Chinese provinces are calculated
with SFA for the period from 2005 to 2010. Then, these scores are regressed against two
fiscal imbalance indicators in a second stage model. Finally, conditional EE scores are
calculated. This paper finds that effects of fiscal imbalances on EE are nonlinear and
conditional on economic development level. Fiscal imbalances are more detrimental to
environment in less developed provinces. These results suggest that the one-sided fiscal
decentralization in China may have regressive environmental effects and contribute to
regional disparity in terms of sustainable development.
JEL Classification: Q56; H76; R51
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1. Introduction
The Tax Sharing System (TSS) reform of 1994 in China has recognized the dominant role of
the central government in intergovernmental fiscal system and recentralized fiscal revenues.
However, expenditure responsibilities have been unrevised and remained largely
decentralized. In 2009, 80% of national expenditures were spent by sub-national government.1
Decentralization is even more remarkable in environmental expenditures. In 2007, more than
95% of national expenditures on environmental protection were spent by sub-national
governments, of which more than a half was realized at sub-provincial level. 2 In fact, the one-
sided expenditure decentralization without revenue-side counterpart has created huge fiscal
imbalances in China. Sub-national, in particular sub-provincial governments have excessively
heavy expenditure responsibilities which are mismatched with their revenue assignments
(World Bank, 2002). These governments depend largely on intergovernmental transfers,
which are not always transparent or adequate.
Several factors can explain why environmental protection services would be
underprovided under such a system.
First, local governments may be obliged to maintain weak environmental enforcement
due to fiscal incapacity. It is argued that, in many poor regions, fiscal resources are so
insufficient that public finance is reduced to some kind of “dining finance” (chi fan cai zheng),
which means the payment of civil servants’ wage (Jing and Liu, 2009). Given the severe
budgetary pressures, certain local governments, especially those of poor localities, can fail to
provide sufficient environmental services or inspection due to lack of funding, quality
personnel and (or) equipment.
Secondly, weak environmental enforcement is also likely to arise due to unwillingness.
Qian and Roland (1998) argue that in the inter-jurisdiction competition for foreign capital and
grants from the central government, local governments will have incentives for too much
infrastructure investment and too few local public goods for a given budget. As a result, when
taking budget priority decision, local governments may have reluctance to spend money in
“unproductive” areas such as environmental protection. Moreover, it seems that this
unwillingness for more stringent environmental enforcement can be reinforced by the severe
1 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (2010).
2 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (2008).
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local budgetary pressures. On one hand, mismatched revenues and expenditure
responsibilities force local governments to trade off between different functions (e.g.,
infrastructure and environmental protection.) On the other hand, in order to fulfill their
responsibilities, local governments struggle to enlarge revenue resources. In particular, they
are likely to set lax environmental stringency to attract polluting capital or to engage in other
short-sighted activities that may compromise environmental protection.3
Finally, mismatched expenditures and revenues can also affect environmental through
corruption. On one hand, as argued by Fisman and Gatti (2002), vertical fiscal transfers may
allow local officials to ignore the financial consequences of mismanagement. Moreover,
transfers may attenuate the direct accountability of a politician in his locality. The authors find
that larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public
office in the U.S.; On the other hand, corruption is found in many studies to be an important
factor of bad environmental governance and environmental deterioration (Lopez and Mitra,
2000; Welsch, 2004). As a result, one may expect that the Chinese one-sided fiscal
decentralization may contribute to ineffective enforcement of environmental regulations due
to enlarged corruption.
In summary, it seems that the current one-sided fiscal decentralization imposes important
constraint on sub-national governments’ enforcement capacity. More importantly, under the
strong fiscal pressure, sub-national governments are incentivized to neglect environmental
protection or to save enforcement efforts.
The actual effect of fiscal decentralization on environment is an empirical question with
important political implications. However, very few studies have investigated this question in
the Chinese context with only two exceptions: Jiang (2006) explores with a case study why
post-reform decentralization in China has failed to bring about environmental sustainability;
Cai and Liu (2010) show that the increase of the disposable financial resources of local
governments helps to control pollution sources with small externalities. This paper tries to
contribute to this part of literature in another approach, in estimating the effect of the one-
sided fiscal decentralization on environmental efficiency at provincial level. It is straight
forward to consider that, if the one-sided decentralization in China affects local environmental
3 A concrete case of the short-sighted activities is the sale of farmland to real estate developers by Chinese local
governments. It is estimated that about 40 million farmers have been stripped of their land by local governments.
http://www.china.org.cn/learning_english/2011-11/08/content_23852110.htm.
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services provision and local environmental stringency, it is high likely to affect localities’
environmental efficiency by modifying their pollution abatement efforts or polluting
behaviors.4
Precisely, I estimate the environmental efficiency (EE) scores of the gross regional
product (GRP) of Chinese provinces and examine whether provinces with larger fiscal
imbalance have higher (or lower) EE scores. As defined later in the paper, EE is the efficiency
of environmental detrimental variables in a production process. EE is chosen as the
environment indicator because it allows measuring environmental performance conditional on
levels of the output and other inputs. Two types of fiscal imbalances are considered: The first
one is the share of central transfers (TR) in provincial expenditures. It measures to which
degree a province is dependent on transfers from the central government; the second one is
fiscal gap (FG) at sub-provincial level. It measures to which degree sub-provincial fiscal
revenues and expenditures are mismatched in a province.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review on EE models in
section 2, a two-stage EE model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to empirical
analysis of the two-stage EE model. Conditional EE are calculated in section 5. At last,
conclusions and political implications are formulated in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Environmental efficiency models
To investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on environment, a comprehensive
environmental performance index must be developed and computed appropriately. In
incorporating environmental variables into a traditional production function, environmental
efficiency calculates have been proposed by a variety of studies. Based on adjustments of
conventional measures of technical efficiency (TE), these estimation methods can be
classified according to two criteria. The first criterion distinguishes deterministic models from
stochastic models, and the second criterion differentiates non-parametric models from
parametric models. In the literature, two families of methods are widely employed, namely
4 Several studies show that environmental stringency in China has an important effect on polluting firms’
behavior (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Wang and Wheeler, 2005) and on local industrial pollution level (Wang and
Wheeler, 2003).
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Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Broeck, 1977) and
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978). SFA is a parametric stochastic
model based on economic theories, while DEA is a nonparametric deterministic model
dispensable of specification forms. Each approach has its advantages and shortcomings
(Hjalmarsson et al., 1996). The present study will choose the SFA approach because
industrial production is a specifiable process and more importantly, SFA is able to distinguish
statistical noise from inefficiency and allows for a formal statistical testing of hypotheses.
Moreover, to my knowledge, most existing studies on Chinese EE have adopted the DEA
approach (Zhang et al., 2008; Yuan and Cheng, 2011; Zhang, 2009; Yang and Pollitt, 2009)
except one (Wu, 2010). The present study will thus allow a comparison with their results.
Jointly produced with conventional desirable outputs, environmentally detrimental
variables are particular because of their undesirable nature. In other words, in order to be
efficient, a producer must maximize his conventional desirable outputs and minimize his
environmental detrimental factors as well as his conventional inputs. Given this particularity,
two groups of technologies have been proposed to introduce environmentally detrimental
variables into the production function. The first group treats them as undesirable outputs,
while the second group considers them as inputs. Since DEA allows treating multiple output
models, it is widely used in the first group technologies. 5 Interesting attempts with SFA
within the first group are realized by Cuesta et al. (2009) and Wu (2010), both of which rely
on distance function models. The second group technologies can be found in both DEA6 and
SFA studies. In the SFA approach, Reinhard et al. (1999; 2000) treat the environmentally
detrimental variables as inputs to estimate the EE of Dutch dairy farms and estimate a
stochastic production function. This measure has been later adopted in numerous agricultural
EE studies (Mkhabela, 2011; Reinhard et al., 2002; Zhang and Xue, 2005).
2.2. Models of environmental efficiency determinants
Determinants of TE can be consistently estimated by the one-stage model proposed by Battese
and Coelli (1995). However, this model isn’t applicable to estimate the determinants of EE
5 A comprehensive survey of such studies is made by Zhou et al. (2008).
6 For exemple, Hailu and Veeman (2001) consider pollution as production input to study the efficiency of
Canadian pulp and paper industry. Yang and Pollitt (2009) consider SO2 emission as input to estimate the
efficiency of the Chinese coal-fired power sector.
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because EE is an adjusted measure of TE. To overcome this problem, a two-stage model is
proposed by Reinhard et al. (2002) to analyze the sources of environmental efficiency
variation: In the first stage, they use SFA to estimate EE scores of producers; in the second
stage, they use again SFA to regress environmental efficiency scores obtained in the first
stage against a set of underground variables. According to the authors, a frontier approach in
the second stage offers both economic and statistical advantages over an OLS or a TOBIT
approach. The reason is as follows. First, conditional estimates of environmental efficiency
scores can be derived from the one-sided error of the second stage SFA; secondly, while
neither OLS nor TOBIT allows estimating conditional EE scores, they are also biased and
inconsistent if the conditional inefficiency exists.7
3. Two-stage SFA Model
The two-stage model of Reinhard et al. (2002) is chosen as the benchmark model for
empirical analysis of this paper. In this section, first I illustrate the definition of EE. Secondly,
EE estimation is developed in the framework of SFA. Finally, I present the second-stage
model to estimate EE determinants and conditional EE.
3.1. Definition of EE
As defined by Reinhard et al. (2000), EE is the ratio of minimum feasible to observed use of
environmentally detrimental inputs, conditional on observed levels of output and the
conventional inputs. This definition is formulated in (1)
{ }min : ( , )R R R
k l
EE θ F X θ Z Y= ≥ (1)
where R
k
X
and RY are observed vectors of conventional inputs and output. k is the number of
conventional inputs. R
l
Z
is the vector of observed environmentally detrimental inputs.
l
is the
number of environmentally detrimental inputs. ( )F i is the best practice production frontier.
The EE measure
θ
is calculated as a radial contraction of the R
l
Z
, conditional on ( )F i , R
k
X
and R
Y
.
7 If the conditional inefficiency exists, disturbance term is skewed with non-zero mean.
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3.2. Estimation of EE with SFA
EE defined in (1) can be estimated with a stochastic production frontier (2):
( , , , , ) exp( ),
it kit lit it it
Y f X Z β γ ζ V U= − 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (2)
where for all producers indexed with a subscript i and for all years indexed with a subscript
t，
it
Y
denotes the output level;
kit
X
is a vector of conventional inputs;
lit
Z
is a vector of environmentally detrimental inputs;
β
,
γ
 and
ζ
are parameters to be estimated;
it
V
is a symmetric random error term, independently and identically distributed as 2(0, )
v
N σ ,
intended to capture the influence of exogenous events beyond the control of the industrial
sector;
it
U
is a non-negative random error term, independently and identically distributed as
2(0, )
u
N σ , intended to capture time-variant technical inefficiency in production.8
A functional form has to be defined for the production function estimation. In order to
avoid excessive misspecification, the commonly employed flexible translog function9
developed by Christensen et al. (1971) is used. Writing (2) in translog form gives (for
convenience subscripts i and t are suppressed in (3), (4) and (5)):
8 In this paper, TE is measured with an output orientation.
9 Compared to a Cobb-Douglas function whose output elasticities and RTS of inputs are constant, the translog
function allows variable elasticities and RTS of inputs, which depend on input levels. Another reason to prefer a
translog function to a Gobb-Douglas one is explained by Reinhard et al. (1999). In fact, if output elasticities of
inputs are constant (as in a Cobb-Douglas function), a ranking by environmental efficiency scores would add no
information to the technical efficiency measure because the two rankings would be identical. The two rankings
can differ, and the environmental efficiency measure can add independent information of its own, only if output
elasticities are variable (e.g. in a translog function).
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0
1
ln ln ln ln ln
2
1
ln ln ln ln
2
j j k k jl j l
j k j l
km k m jk j k
k m j k
Y β β X γ Z β X X
γ Z Z ζ X Z V U
= + + +
+ + + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
(3)
where
jl lj
β β= ;
jl lj
γ γ= . The logarithm of the output of a technically efficient producer is
obtained by setting U
it
= 0 in (3). Since the environmental efficiency implies technical
efficiency (Reinhard et al., 1999), the logarithm of the output of an environmentally efficient
producer is obtained by replacing Z with EE ·Z and setting U = 0 in (3), which gives (4):
0
1
ln ln ln( ) ln ln
2
1
ln( ) ln( ) ln ln( )
2
j j k k jl j l
j k j l
km k m jk j k
k m j k
Y β β X γ EE Z β X X
γ EE Z EE Z ζ X EE Z V
= + + +
+ + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
i
i i i
(4)
Setting (3) and (4) equal permits the isolation of lnEE in (5):
2 1/2ln ( 2 ) /
km km
k m k m
EE b b U γ γ
⎡ ⎤= − ± −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ (5)
where b is equal to the sum of the output elasticities with respect to the environmentally
detrimental inputs. The b term is positive if the monotonicity conditions are fulfilled. In this
function, the “+√” is applied because if U = 0, only when the “+√” is used, the lnEE is equal
to “0”. U can be calculated from (6), the stochastic version of the output-oriented TE:
0 exp( ) 1,
( , , , , ) exp( )
it
it it
it it it
Y
TE U
f X Z β γ ζ V
≤ = = − ≤
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (6)
TE can be calculated using the Battese and Coelli (1988) estimator (7):
{ } 2* * * * *
* *
1 Φ( / 1
exp / ( ) exp
1 Φ( / 2
it
it it it it it
it
σ μ σ
TE E U V U μ σ
μ σ
⎡ ⎤− − ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= − − = − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ − − ⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
i）
）
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (7)
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where Φ i（） is the standard normal distribution function, 2 2 1/2* / ( )u v u vσ σ σ σ σ= + , and
2 2 2 2
* -( ) + / ( )it it it u v u vμ V U σ μσ σ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ . Parameters
2 2( , , , )
u v
β σ σ μ are estimated using maximum
likelihood techniques.
3.3. Estimate EE determinants and conditional EE
In order to examine effects of fiscal decentralization on EE, the second-stage SFA model
proposed by Reinhard et al. (2002) has to be estimated. SFA is preferred here because it
allows calculating environmental inefficiency with the one-sided error term, even after
accounting for the underground variables (Greene, 1999). Conditional EE scores can thus be
calculated. The second-stage frontier regression model can be expressed in the following
general form:10
{ }* *( ) exp ,
it it it it
EE G W δ V U= −i i 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (8)
where W
it
is a vector of observed explanatory variables expected to influence EE
it
,
δ
  is a
vector of parameters to be estimated, *
* 2(0, )
it
it
V
V N σ∼ and ** * 2( , )
it
it
U
U N μ σ
+∼ . In (8), the EE
it
is assumed to be determined by three sources: (i) inefficiency explained by the observed
underground variables captured by ( )
it
G W δi ; (ii) statistical noise reflected in *
it
V ; and (iii) an
unexplained environmental inefficiency reflected in *
it
U . Thus, as defined in (9), the
conditional (adjusted) environmental efficiency CEE
it
can be defined as TE
it
*, the technical
efficiency of (8), once effects of underground variables are taken into account.11
( ) { } { }* * */ ; exp exp 1,
it it it it it it
CEE TE EE G W δ V U
⎡ ⎤= = ⋅ = − ≤⎣ ⎦
1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (9)
10 A Cobb-Douglas function is used in this stage.
11 Consider two producers with the same unadjusted EE scores. Assume that one produces under a more
favorable external background than the other and that the background has an effect on both producers’
performance. Then it is reasonable to think that the real EE score of the former would be inferior to that of the
latter if external background variables are controlled. The same reasoning can be found in background variable
models in the DEA framework (Fried et al., 2002; Cooper et al., 2006)
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4. Empirical analysis
In this section, empirical data are used to estimate EE of Chinese provinces’ GRP and the
effect of the one-sided fiscal decentralization on EE.
4.1. Data and variables
Using data published in various issues of China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical
Yearbook for Regional Economy, Finance yearbook of China and China Population Statistical
Yearbook, the present study is based on a panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces (and centrally
administrated municipalities, Hongkong, Macao and Tibet excluded). China conducted a
comprehensive national economic survey in 2004 and subsequently revised the country’s
GDP and GRP figures. As a result, the year 2004 marks a break in the time series of Chinese
data. In order to avoid the bias caused by this break in EE estimation, I decide to base the
first-stage estimation (of EE scores) on the period 2005-2010. The second-stage estimation (of
decentralization effect) is base on the period 2005-2009, due to the data unavailability of
several explicative variables in 2010.12
The output (Y) of the first-stage SFA model is the GRP of each province at constant price.
The choice of this added value indicator as output indicator is conventional in macroeconomic
efficiency such as total factor productivity (TFP) studies. Provincial capital stock (K) in
constant prices,13 total employment in each province (L) and the time trend (T) are three
conventional inputs. T aims to capture technological progress. The environmentally
detrimental input introduced in the model is the total energy consumption of each province.
The reason for the choice of energy consumption rather than other pollutants e.g. carbon
dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2) or chemical oxygen demand (COD) is the following.
First of all, emission data of CO2 (the major greenhouse gas, which contributes to global
warming) are not published in China. Although SO2 and COD are relevant pollution in
wastewater and waste gas, their statistics published in China Statistical Yearbook suffer from
inaccuracies. In fact, China publishes a combination of survey data for all key industrial
enterprises and estimation data for non-key enterprises,14 both of which can be easily biased.
12 When the first draft of this paper was completed, 2010 statistics of several indicators (e.g. sub-provincial
budgetary expenditures) in the 2nd-stage estimation were not yet published.
13 Calculated by author following Zhang (2004).
14 China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2011)
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That’s why I consider an alternative input- the total energy consumption: Energy is an
indispensable input of production. Moreover, it is also a proxy for CO2 emissions. It is often
believed that energy intensity of businesses is a major determinant for CO2 pollution, which
is especially true in China where power generation still depends primarily on coal.15 Finally,
energy consumption data published in China Statistical Yearbook come from the energy
balance sheets. Total energy consumption covers the energy consumption of the whole society,
including that of village industries. These sheets are elaborated based on the law of
conservation of energy, thus more reliable than pollution data.
In the second-stage model, EE scores obtained in the first stage are regressed against
transfer’s rate (TR) and fiscal gap (FG) respectively, as well as a set of control variables. The
indicator of TR is calculated as follows in equation (10):
/
it it it
TR Transfers Expenditures= 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (10)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, Transfers
it
denotes the total fiscal
transfers that province i receives from the central government in year t, and Expenditures
it
denotes the consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by province i in year t. The
construction of TR is inspired by cross-country decentralization indicators proposed by IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), where vertical imbalance of a country is measured as
transfers to sub-national governments as a share of sub-national government expenditures. In
this paper, TR indicates the degree to which a province relies on transfers to support its
expenditures.16 The indicator of FG is measured as follows in equation (11):
1 1 1
( Re ) /
j j j
it
ijt ijt ijt
FG Expenditures venues Expenditures= −∑ ∑ ∑
1,..., ,t T= 1,..., ,j J= 1,...,i I= (11)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, j denotes prefectures in province i,
Expenditures
ijt
denotes consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by prefecture j of province
i in year t. Revenues
ijt
denotes consolidated budgetary revenues raised by prefecture j of
province i in year t. Default of transfers data at sub-provincial level, FG can also be
15 In 2010, more than 70% of energy consumed in China was from coal (NBSC, 2011).
16 Following the GFS indicator, VI doesn’t distinguish conditional transfers versus general purpose transfers, due
to data unavailability.
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considered as a proxy of vertical imbalance within a province, because prefectures need
transfers to meet the gap between their expenditures and revenues.
Besides decentralization, a set of control variables which are likely to affect EE is also
introduced. These variables include income per capita (Dev), population density (Density),
trade openness (Open), foreign direct investment (FDI), education (Edu), urbanization
(Urban), unemployment rate (Unemployment), state-owned sector importance (State), coast
dummy (Coast) and year dummies (D2006, D2007, D2008 and D2009). These variables are
selected because, first, they are commonly used in micro, sectoral or macro studies as TFP
determinants (Isaksson, 2007; Li and Hu, 2002; Beeson and Husted, 1989; Söderbom and
Teal, 2004); Moreover, some of these variables, e.g. income per capita, population density,
trade openness, foreign direct investment and education, are also frequently used as control
variables in Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) studies (Gangadharan and Valenzuela,
2001). It seems that if these variables have effects on either productivity or environment, they
are very likely to affect EE. Definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables are presented
in Appendices I and II.
4.2. Technical efficiency and non-adjusted environmental efficiency scores
Technical efficiency scores are maximum likelihood estimates computed with the software
package Frontier 4.1 developed by (Coelli, 1996). First, the time-variant translog stochastic
production frontier with a normal-truncated normal error distribution was estimated. Tests of
hypothesis for parameters are presented in Table 1. According to likelihood ration (LR) tests,
the null hypothesis of absence of technical inefficiency 2 2 2/ ( ) 0
u u v
γ σ σ σ= + = is strongly
rejected. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of half-normal distribution 0μ = and the null
hypothesis of time-invariance cannot be rejected. Thus, the specification of time-invariant
half-normal stochastic frontier is adopted to estimate the 1st-stage model.
All estimated parameters are summarized in Table 2, which are used in the following to
generate the TE and non-adjusted EE scores.
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Table 1: Tests of hypothesis for parameters
Specification
Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
1. Truncated-
normal
stochastic
313.671
2. Absence of
U
it
0γ = 1 -2.215 631.771 0.000 rejected
3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 323.305 0.732 0.694 accepted
4. Time-
invariant
0, 0μ η= = 3 312.035 2.540 0.111 accepted
Table 2: Parameter estimates
Parameter
coefficient
estimate
standard error Parameter
coefficient
estimate
standard error
0β 24.469 8.528 ltβ -0.013 0.009
k
β 0.998 0.575
ee
γ 0.089 0.040
l
β -0.229 0.737
ke
ζ -0.049 0.035
t
β 0.312 0.188
le
ζ 0.029 0.052
e
γ -2.211 1.078
te
ζ -0.011 0.012
kk
β 0.003 0.015 2
σ
0.402 0.113
ll
β -0.011 0.029 2 2/
u
σ σ 0.999 0.000
tt
β 0.002 0.001 μ 0
kl
β -0.004 0.030 η 0
kt
β 0.004 0.005
Note: The subscripts k, l, t and e refer to capital, labor, time trend, and energy consumption,
respectively.
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Table 3 reports elasticities of output with respect to each input. The sum of the mean
output elasticities of four inputs indicates the presence of increasing returns to scale. The
monotonicity assumption is violated for none of the inputs.
Table 3: Output elasticities
Capital Labor Time Energy Total
Mean 0.123 0.079 0.051 0.856 1.108
Minimum 0.064 0.034 0.024 0.486 0.879
Lower quartile 0.096 0.065 0.038 0.786 1.064
Median 0.122 0.079 0.048 0.870 1.119
Upper quartile 0.143 0.094 0.059 0.947 1.161
Maximum 0.234 0.121 0.092 1.036 1.231
S.D. 0.034 0.020 0.016 0.115 0.071
Estimated TE and EE are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. TE scores vary from 27.4% to
98.8%, with a mean of 63.4%, in line with the findings of Zhang (2009). Ningxia (27.4%),
Guizhou (31.8%) and Qinghai (31.8%) have the lowest TE scores, all in west China.
Meanwhile, Guangdong (98.8%), Beijing (98.1%) and Shanghai (97.6%), the most
economically developed regions in China, have the highest TE scores. EE scores vary from
3.6% to 98.8%, with an overall mean of 57.3%. Over the period 2005-2010, Ningxia (7.3%),
Qinghai (7.4%) and Gansu (21.1%) have the lowest mean EE scores, while Guangdong
(98.8%), Beijing (97.4%) and Shanghai (97.0%) have the highest mean EE scores.
Nevertheless, these EE scores will be further adjusted.
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Table 4: Estimates of TE and non-adjusted EE
Technical efficiency Environmental efficiency
Overall mean 63.4% 57.3%
Overall minimum 27.4% 3.6%
Overall lower quartile 45.1% 41.0%
Overall median 61.2% 56.3%
Overall upper quartile 81.2% 76.4%
Overall maximum 98.8% 98.8%
Overall Standard Deviation (S.D.). 0.213 0.254
Overall observation number 180 177
Note: Three EEs cannot be solved.
Table 5: Estimates of non-adjusted EE by year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean 57.2% 57.5% 56.4% 57.5% 57.1% 58.2%
Minimum 3.6% 4.9% 5.0% 8.9% 7.4% 8.5%
Lower quartile 47.6% 48.1% 40.1% 41.0% 40.5% 50.1%
Median 55.5% 55.9% 56.0% 56.9% 56.7% 57.7%
Upper quartile 75.3% 75.6% 76.0% 76.7% 76.4% 76.6%
Maximum 98.7% 98.7% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8%
S.D. 0.255 0.253 0.263 0.256 0.259 0.258
Observation number 29 29 30 30 30 29
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai Na Na Na Xinjiang
4.3. Effects of fiscal imbalance
Based on the second-stage EE model, EE scores are regressed against TR and FG. Among the
set of control variables, income per capita (Dev) and population density (Density) are put in
logarithm. In order to be in line with EKC studies, cubed and squared income per capita (Dev3
and Dev2) are included.
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4.3.1. Linear effects of TR and FG
First, linear effects of TR and FG are tested for. I start with a time-variant model where the
distribution of the one-sided error is normal-truncated. Specification tests statistics are
summarized in Table 6. According to the LR tests, for both TR and FG, the null hypothesis of
0γ = is strongly rejected, indicating the presence of stochastic errors and the necessary of the
SFA model. The null hypothesis 0μ = can’t be rejected at 5% level of significance. The null
hypothesis of 0η = is strongly rejected. As a result, the time-variant model with half-normal
distribution is adopted for the second-stage SFA.
Table 6: Specification tests for the 2nd-stage linear effect model
Indicator Specification Null
hypothesis
Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal
stochastic
456.362
TR 2. Absence of U
it 0γ = 1 94.290 724.144 0.000 rejected
TR 3. Half-normal 0μ = 1 456.006 0.712 0.399 accepted
TR 4. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 3 450.870 10.271 0.001 rejected
FG 5. Truncated-normal
stochastic
456.970
FG 6. Absence of U
it 0γ = 5 91.816 730.307 0.000 rejected
FG 7. Half-normal 0μ = 5 456.621 0.698 0.403 accepted
FG 8. Time-invariant 0, 0μ η= = 7 451.012 11.218 0.001 rejected
Estimation results are presented in Tables 7. Both TR and FG have positive and non-
significant coefficients. These results suggest that fiscal imbalance don’t have any significant
effects on EE, which seems to go against the prediction. However, insignificant linear effects
of TR and FG are not surprising because it is reasonable to think that fiscal imbalance may
have different effects on EE under different circumstances. For example, poor localities may
be more vulnerable facing fiscal pressures and sacrifice more easily environment. As a result,
in the following, nonlinear effects of TR and FG on EE will be considered. Concerning
control variables, most of they have expected signs, among which squared income per capita,
trade openness, population density and Coast dummy have positive and significant
coefficients, while income per capita, cubed income per capita, FDI, illiterate rate and year
dummies have negative and significant coefficients.
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Table 7: Estimation with linear TR and FG effects
With TR With FG
Constant 1.377* (1.758) 1.407* (1.797)
TR 0.006 (0.259)
FG 0.019 (1.151)
Dev
3 -0.004** (-2.356) -0.004** (-2.359)
Dev
2 0.088** (2.268) 0.090** (2.292)
Dev -0.610** (-1.990) -0.626** (-2.034)
Open 0.021** (2.336) 0.019** (2.171)
FDI -0.194** (-2.237) -0.173** (-1.966)
Edu -0.113* (-1.818) -0.115* (-1.938)
Unemployment -0.165 (-0.595) -0.164 (-0.622)
Urban -0.056 (-0.925) -0.062 (-1.035)
State -0.097 (-1.441) -0.098 (-1.489)
Density 0.127*** (5.850) 0.131*** (6.078)
Coast 0.127*** (11.114) 0.133*** (10.871)
D2006 -0.010*** (-4.384) -0.010*** (-4.627)
D2007 -0.018*** (-4.355) -0.018*** (-4.771)
D2008 -0.024*** (-3.464) -0.025*** (-3.839)
D2009 -0.036*** (-4.246) -0.038*** (-4.701)
2
σ
0.084*** (3.899) 0.085*** (4.052)
γ
1.000*** (13148.850) 1.000*** (13592.846)
μ
0 0
η
0.006*** (3.126) 0.006*** (3.249)
Log likelihood function 456.006 456.621
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at
5% level, * significance at 10% level.
4.3.2. Nonlinear effects of TR and FG
In order to examine potential nonlinear effects of TR and FG, interactions between fiscal
imbalances and income per capita are created, namely
TR Dev∗ and FG Dev∗ . These
interactions allow testing whether effects of fiscal imbalances on EE in a province depend on
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its economic development level.17 The LR test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesizes
that the coefficients
TR DEV
β ∗ and FG DEVβ ∗ (associated respectively to
TR DEV∗ and FG DEV∗ ) are equal to zero. This means that the specifications with
interactions are more fit than those without interactions. Once again, the time-variant model
with half-normal distribution is adopted. Specification tests statistics are summarized in Table
8. Regression results are presented in Table 9.
Table 8: Specification tests for the 2nd-stage nonlinear effect model
Indicator Specification Null hypothesis Tested
against
Log
likelihood
Likelihood
ratio
2
Prob χ> Decision
TR 1. Truncated-normal with
nonlinear TR
464.771
TR 2. Truncated-normal with
linear TR
0
TR DEV
β ∗ = 1 456.362 16.818 0.000 rejected
TR
3. Absence of U
it
0γ = 1 94.405 740.732 0.000 rejected
TR
4. Half-normal
0μ = 1 464.675 0.193 0.661 accepted
TR
5. Time-invariant
0, 0μ η= = 3 459.907 9.536 0.002 rejected
FG 6. Truncated-normal with
nonlinear FG
463.607
FG 7. Truncated-normal with
linear FG
0
FG DEV
β ∗ = 6 456.970 13.274 0.000 rejected
FG
8. Absence of U
it
0γ = 6 92.182 742.850 0.000 rejected
FG
9. Half-normal
0μ = 6 463.529 0.156 0.693 accepted
FG
10. Time-invariant
0, 0μ η= = 9 458.074 10.910 0.001 rejected
It is notable that when interactions are included, both TR and FG as well as their
interactions with income per capita have significant coefficients, suggesting the significant
nonlinear effects of fiscal imbalances on EE. Precisely, the marginal effects of TR and FG are
conditional on income per capita. Their marginal effects are offset by economic development
level, i.e., the more a province is affluent, the less fiscal imbalances are detrimental to EE,
17 An important issue worth considering is the potential endogeneity of income per capita in the 2nd-stage model
(Stern, 2004). Several alternative models i.e., IV estimator, lagged endogenous variables and control function
method have been estimated in order to control the potential bias. All of these models give consistent results with
what are reported in the paper. The nonlinear effects of fiscal imbalance found in the paper are thus robust.
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vice versa. These results seem to confirm the hypothesis that fiscal imbalances have more
serious environmental consequences in poorer localities than in richer ones. In these two
nonlinear-effect models, control variables have the same signs as in previous linear effect
models, although different orders of income per capita become non-significant in TR
regression.
Table 9: Estimates with nonlinear TR and FG effects
With TR With FG
Constant 0.882 (1.203) 1.958*** (2.708)
TR -0.529*** (-4.340)
T R D E V∗ 0.071*** (4.478)
FG -0.362*** (-3.595)
F G D E V∗ 0.047*** (3.841)
Dev3 -0.001 (-0.910) -0.004*** (-3.038)
Dev2 0.038 (1.020) 0.103*** (3.018)
Dev -0.320 (-1.119) -0.783*** (-2.883)
Open 0.011 (1.256) 0.004 (0.420)
FDI -0.153** (-1.890) -0.170** (-2.048)
Edu -0.078 (-1.402) -0.115** (-2.109)
Unemployment -0.126 (-0.497) -0.091 (-0.363)
Urban -0.006 (-0.126) -0.031 (-0.872)
State -0.088 (-1.432) -0.097 (-1.577)
Density 0.144*** (11.681) 0.141*** (22.243)
Coast 0.142*** (12.449) 0.143*** (12.057)
D2006 -0.007*** (-3.208) -0.007*** (-3.613)
D2007 -0.011*** (-2.914) -0.013*** (-3.418)
D2008 -0.015** (-2.337) -0.017*** (-2.617)
D2009 -0.028*** (-3.648) -0.031*** (-3.914)
2
σ
0.085*** (3.954) 0.084*** (3.813)
γ 1.000*** (15223.715) 1.000*** (15304.738)
μ 0 0
η 0.005*** (3.085) 0.005*** (3.907)
Log likelihood function 464.675 463.529
Note: t-student statistics between parentheses, *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at
5% level, * significance at 10% level.
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4.3.3. Marginal effects of TR and FG
Overall marginal effects of TR and FG are reported in Table 10. Critical values of income per
capita below which the marginal effects are negative are also reported. It is notable that while
both indictors have positive mean marginal effect on EE, an increase in fiscal imbalance is
still detrimental to environment in a considerable number of the least affluent provinces (27%
for TR and 43% for FG).
Table 10: Overall marginal effects of fiscal imbalances
With TR With FG
Mean 0.028 0.008
Minimum -0.073 -0.060
Lower quartile -0.004 -0.014
Median 0.026 0.006
Upper quartile 0.051 0.022
Maximum 0.137 0.079
S.D. 0.042 0.028
Critical value of income per capita 1726.152 2190.907
% of observations with negative marginal effects 27.0% 43.2%
Observation number 148 148
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai
Note: Critical value of income per capita is in 2005 USD.
5. Conditional environmental efficiency
In this subsection, CEE scores are calculated using results of the second-stage SFA. Although
consistent results have been found regarding nonlinear effects of TR and FG, the model with
TR has higher log likelihood value. According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC), this
model is preferred because it has a smaller AIC value. Thus, the adjusted environmental
efficiency scores are calculated based on the two-stage SFA with TR. Summary of overall
provincial CEE scores by region is presented in Table 11. It is remarkable that Chinese
provinces have on average relatively higher EE scores once external variables are controlled.
CEE scores vary from 10.2% to 99.6% with an overall mean of 69.3%. Among the seven
regions, East China has the highest mean scores (84.2%), followed by South China (75.0%)
and Northeast China (74.9%). Northwest China has the lowest mean scores (51.2%), far
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behind the others. Summary of CEE by year is presented in Table 12. It seems that CEE
scores are relatively stable over this period. The three provinces with the highest mean CEE
scores are Beijing (99.6%), Fujian (99.5%) and Jiangxi (99.5%). The three provinces with the
lowest mean CEE scores are Ningxia (11.0%), Qinghai (27.0%) and Guizhou (30.6%). The
concordance between EE ranking and CEE ranking is positive and significant. The Spearman
rank correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.715. The null hypothesis that the
two rankings are independent can be strongly rejected. The entire rankings list of EE and CEE
scores can be found in Appendix III.
Table 11: Summary of overall and regional CEE scores
Overall North Northeast East Center South Southwest Northwest
Mean 69.3% 63.2% 74.9% 84.2% 69.4% 75.0% 63.3% 51.2%
Minimum 10.2% 32.0% 53.6% 56.7% 62.3% 58.8% 29.9% 10.2%
Lower
quartile
57.4% 40.8% 54.2% 75.4% 62.9% 59.4% 47.2% 26.7%
Median 71.8% 68.2% 72.0% 88.9% 70.9% 70.9% 66.6% 40.0%
Upper
quartile
89.6% 74.5% 98.8% 99.5% 74.6% 94.8% 79.7% 73.4%
Maximum 99.6% 99.6% 98.8% 99.5% 75.0% 94.9% 89.7% 95.5%
S.D. 0.233 0.246 0.191 0.141 0.052 0.154 0.218 0.321
Nb. of ob. 148 25 15 35 15 15 20 23
Dropped
province
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Qinghai
Table 12: Summary of CEE by year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean 69.9% 70.1% 68.7% 68.9% 69.1%
Minimum 10.2% 10.6% 11.0% 11.5% 11.9%
Lower quartile 58.8% 59.0% 57.1% 57.3% 57.5%
Median 71.7% 71.8% 71.4% 71.6% 71.7%
Upper quartile 89.5% 89.5% 89.6% 89.6% 89.7%
Maximum 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6%
S.D. 0.232 0.231 0.240 0.239 0.237
Observation number 29 29 30 30 30
Dropped province Qinghai Qinghai Na Na Na
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6. Conclusion
Decentralization has been promoted by major international institutions. Proponent arguments
defending the merits of decentralization are abundant. However, many studies show that
decentralization may be inefficient for environmental protection. China’s one-sided fiscal
decentralization has shown an example. After 1994, public expenditures are largely
decentralized while fiscal revenues are recentralized. Sub-national, in particular sub-
provincial governments have excessively heavy expenditure responsibilities which are
mismatched with their revenue assignments. Sub-national governments have huge fiscal
imbalances and depend basically on transfers to fulfill their expenditure responsibilities. It
seems that this critical situation may have negative effects on environmental protection.
Localities, especially poor ones, are likely to under-provide environmental protection service
either due to incapacity or incentive to develop economy at the cost of environment.
In this paper, I study empirically the environmental effect of this one-sided fiscal
decentralization. Precisely, I examine whether fiscal imbalances caused by this
decentralization improve or reduce environmental efficiency of Chinese provinces. Following
the two-stage EE model of Reinhard et al. (2000), I first calculate with EE scores of Chinese
provinces’ gross regional product over the period 2005-2010. After that, EE scores are
regressed against two fiscal imbalance indicators, TR and FG, in order to test the linear and
nonlinear effects of the latter. Finally, adjusted EE scores are calculated conditional on fiscal
imbalances and other underground variables.
The empirical results are interesting to interpret. During the period of study, fiscal
imbalances have nonlinear effects on EE of Chinese provinces. Moreover, these effects seem
to be conditional on economic development level, i.e., fiscal imbalances seem to be more
detrimental in less affluent provinces, which confirm the vulnerability of poor localities in
face of severe fiscal pressures. In at least 27% of the cases, larger fiscal imbalances reduce EE.
Once external factors are controlled, Chinese provinces have on average an adjusted EE score
of 69.3%, considerably higher than 57.3% before the adjustment. This increase suggests that
the overall external context in China contributes to environmental inefficiency. If all
provinces had the same external context as the most advantageous one, mean EE would
increase from 57.3% to 69.3%.
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Results obtained in this paper call for attention to the potential negative environmental effects
of the one-sided fiscal decentralization in poor provinces. Too many responsibilities without
adequate revenues can lead to inefficient resource allocation; severe fiscal pressures may
encourage poor localities to engage in short-term behaviors, e.g. developing economy at the
cost of environment. Moreover, since the effects are nonlinear, it seems that this fiscal
decentralization has regressive environmental effects in contributing to disparity across
regions in terms of sustainable development. Although the choice between more revenue
autonomy and less expenditure responsibilities is still a political debate in China, it is certain
that the balance between expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments need to be
redressed for a more sustainable regional development in this country.
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Appendices:
Appendix I: Name and description of variables
Variable Description
Y
Gross regional product (10000 USD at
2005 price)
K Provincial capital stock (10000 RMB at 1952 price)
L Total provincial employment at the end of year (10000
persons)
T Time trend
E
Total energy consumption ( ton of Standard Coal
Equivalent)
TR
Share of central transfers in provincial
expenditures
FG Fiscal gap
Dev Income per capita (2005 USD)
Open (Exportation + Importation)/ Gross regional product
FDI Foreign direct investments/ Gross regional product
Edu Illiterate rate
Unemployment Unemployment rate
Urban Non-agricultural population/total population
State Employment of state-owned sector/total employment
Density Population /km2
Coast 1 if coast province, 0 otherwise
D2006 1 if the year of 2006, 0 otherwise
D2007 1 if the year of 2007, 0 otherwise
D2008 1 if the year of 2008, 0 otherwise
D2009 1 if the year of 2009, 0 otherwise
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Appendix II: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Y 180 14300000 12900000 663023 69500000
K 180 54300000 49100000 3714443 263000000
L 180 2423.416 1602.439 267.619 6041.557
T 180 3.500 1.713 1 6
E 179 138000000 94900000 8221845 497000000
TR 148 0.509 0.183 0.141 0.857
FG 148 0.478 0.182 0.078 0.818
Dev 148 3102.874 2125.191 616.500 11862.610
Open 148 0.359 0.410 0.045 1.668
FDI 148 0.026 0.020 0.001 0.082
Edu 148 0.088 0.046 0.028 0.223
Unemployment 148 0.038 0.006 0.014 0.056
Urban 148 0.367 0.164 0.158 0.880
State 148 0.111 0.048 0.053 0.245
Density 148 411.474 534.697 7.667 3029.969
Coast 148 0.372 0.485 0 1
D2006 148 0.196 0.398 0 1
D2007 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
D2008 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
D2009 148 0.203 0.403 0 1
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Appendix III: Ranking lists of mean EE and CEE scores
Province CEE ranking EE ranking mean CEE score mean EE score Region
Beijing 1 3 0.996 0.937 North China
Fujian 2 10 0.995 0.704 East China
Jiangxi 3 24 0.995 0.300 East China
Heilongjiang 4 21 0.988 0.363 Northeast China
Xinjiang 5 26 0.954 0.294 Northwest China
Guangdong 6 1 0.949 0.946 South China
Yunnan 7 4 0.896 0.935 Southwest China
Anhui 8 14 0.896 0.566 East China
Zhejiang 9 9 0.889 0.732 East China
Jiangsu 10 11 0.792 0.625 East China
Shanghai 11 8 0.753 0.876 East China
Hunan 12 28 0.747 0.263 Center China
Inner Mongolia 13 6 0.744 0.916 North China
Shaanxi 14 17 0.732 0.484 Northwest China
Jilin 15 29 0.720 0.248 Northeast China
Guangxi 16 30 0.709 0.116 South China
Hubei 17 19 0.709 0.384 Center China
Sichuan 18 25 0.696 0.298 Southwest China
Tianjin 19 5 0.682 0.925 North China
Chongqing 20 13 0.636 0.576 Southwest China
Henan 21 15 0.627 0.548 Center China
Hainan 22 27 0.592 0.291 South China
Shandong 23 2 0.571 0.937 East China
Liaoning 24 7 0.540 0.914 Northeast China
Hebei 25 16 0.411 0.510 North China
Gansu 26 22 0.397 0.362 Northwest China
Shanxi 27 18 0.326 0.424 North China
Guizhou 28 12 0.306 0.616 Southwest China
Qinghai 29 20 0.270 0.372 Northwest China
Ningxia 30 23 0.110 0.341 Northwest China
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